Satisfaction and preferences in a legality social dilemma: Does corporate social responsibility impact consumers’ behaviour?
We investigate players’ preferences in a multiplayer prisoner's dilemma by comparing results from satisfaction-based and a choice-based approach by means of a laboratory experiment. The experimental design tests the effects of the legality rating frame on consumers’ choice between products from...
Veröffentlicht in: | 369 EGFR SIGNALING IMPAIRS THE ANTIVIRAL ACTIVITY OF INTERFERON-ALPHA. - 2013 JPMOD : a social science forum of world issues. - Amsterdam [u.a.] |
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1. Verfasser: | |
Weitere Verfasser: | , , |
Format: | Online-Aufsatz |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
2020transfer abstract
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Zugriff auf das übergeordnete Werk: | 369 EGFR SIGNALING IMPAIRS THE ANTIVIRAL ACTIVITY OF INTERFERON-ALPHA |
Schlagworte: | D73 D7 H2 C92 |
Umfang: | 20 |
Zusammenfassung: | We investigate players’ preferences in a multiplayer prisoner's dilemma by comparing results from satisfaction-based and a choice-based approach by means of a laboratory experiment. The experimental design tests the effects of the legality rating frame on consumers’ choice between products from producers labeled by the legality rating and products by unlabeled producers. Both approaches provide strong evidence of preference heterogeneity, with players who cooperate above median being less affected in their choice by monetary payoffs vis-à-vis the public good component. The empirical findings support the hypothesis of our theoretical model that (part of the) players have, in addition to the standard self-interest component, an other-regarding preference argument that is further satisfied in the legality frame plus conformity design. We investigate players’ preferences in a multiplayer prisoner's dilemma by comparing results from satisfaction-based and a choice-based approach by means of a laboratory experiment. The experimental design tests the effects of the legality rating frame on consumers’ choice between products from producers labeled by the legality rating and products by unlabeled producers. Both approaches provide strong evidence of preference heterogeneity, with players who cooperate above median being less affected in their choice by monetary payoffs vis-à-vis the public good component. The empirical findings support the hypothesis of our theoretical model that (part of the) players have, in addition to the standard self-interest component, an other-regarding preference argument that is further satisfied in the legality frame plus conformity design. |
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Beschreibung: | 20 |
DOI: | 10.1016/j.jpolmod.2019.07.003 |