The signalling role of over-education and qualifications mismatch

Over-education may arise from the voluntary decisions of individuals to acquire more qualifications than those required in the workplace, such that over-education may have a signaling role that allows workers to compensate for the lack of certain other skills, or to gain access to the labor market....

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:369 EGFR SIGNALING IMPAIRS THE ANTIVIRAL ACTIVITY OF INTERFERON-ALPHA. - 2013 JPMOD : a social science forum of world issues. - Amsterdam [u.a.]
1. Verfasser: Garcia-Mainar, Inmaculada (VerfasserIn)
Weitere Verfasser: Montuenga, Victor M. (BerichterstatterIn)
Format: Online-Aufsatz
Sprache:English
Veröffentlicht: 2019transfer abstract
Zugriff auf das übergeordnete Werk:369 EGFR SIGNALING IMPAIRS THE ANTIVIRAL ACTIVITY OF INTERFERON-ALPHA
Schlagworte:J28 I26 J24
Umfang:21
Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:Over-education may arise from the voluntary decisions of individuals to acquire more qualifications than those required in the workplace, such that over-education may have a signaling role that allows workers to compensate for the lack of certain other skills, or to gain access to the labor market. This paper analyses the signaling role of over-education in Spain, a country characterised by a strongly-segmented labor market with high unemployment levels, and a large number of over-educated. Using micro data for a representative sample of Spanish workers, three different methods are applied to provide evidence that educational mismatch plays a clear signaling role. Policy implications are derived to alleviate inefficiencies in the allocation of educational resources and in the incentives of workers to use over-education as a signal.
Over-education may arise from the voluntary decisions of individuals to acquire more qualifications than those required in the workplace, such that over-education may have a signaling role that allows workers to compensate for the lack of certain other skills, or to gain access to the labor market. This paper analyses the signaling role of over-education in Spain, a country characterised by a strongly-segmented labor market with high unemployment levels, and a large number of over-educated. Using micro data for a representative sample of Spanish workers, three different methods are applied to provide evidence that educational mismatch plays a clear signaling role. Policy implications are derived to alleviate inefficiencies in the allocation of educational resources and in the incentives of workers to use over-education as a signal.
Beschreibung:21
DOI:10.1016/j.jpolmod.2019.02.015