The signalling role of over-education and qualifications mismatch
Over-education may arise from the voluntary decisions of individuals to acquire more qualifications than those required in the workplace, such that over-education may have a signaling role that allows workers to compensate for the lack of certain other skills, or to gain access to the labor market....
Veröffentlicht in: | 369 EGFR SIGNALING IMPAIRS THE ANTIVIRAL ACTIVITY OF INTERFERON-ALPHA. - 2013 JPMOD : a social science forum of world issues. - Amsterdam [u.a.] |
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Format: | Online-Aufsatz |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
2019transfer abstract
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Zugriff auf das übergeordnete Werk: | 369 EGFR SIGNALING IMPAIRS THE ANTIVIRAL ACTIVITY OF INTERFERON-ALPHA |
Schlagworte: | J28 I26 J24 |
Umfang: | 21 |
Zusammenfassung: | Over-education may arise from the voluntary decisions of individuals to acquire more qualifications than those required in the workplace, such that over-education may have a signaling role that allows workers to compensate for the lack of certain other skills, or to gain access to the labor market. This paper analyses the signaling role of over-education in Spain, a country characterised by a strongly-segmented labor market with high unemployment levels, and a large number of over-educated. Using micro data for a representative sample of Spanish workers, three different methods are applied to provide evidence that educational mismatch plays a clear signaling role. Policy implications are derived to alleviate inefficiencies in the allocation of educational resources and in the incentives of workers to use over-education as a signal. Over-education may arise from the voluntary decisions of individuals to acquire more qualifications than those required in the workplace, such that over-education may have a signaling role that allows workers to compensate for the lack of certain other skills, or to gain access to the labor market. This paper analyses the signaling role of over-education in Spain, a country characterised by a strongly-segmented labor market with high unemployment levels, and a large number of over-educated. Using micro data for a representative sample of Spanish workers, three different methods are applied to provide evidence that educational mismatch plays a clear signaling role. Policy implications are derived to alleviate inefficiencies in the allocation of educational resources and in the incentives of workers to use over-education as a signal. |
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Beschreibung: | 21 |
DOI: | 10.1016/j.jpolmod.2019.02.015 |