Inducing Deterrence through Moral Hazard in Alliance Contracts
Do military alliances foster aggressive behavior in allies to the point of undermining the security goal of the alliance? Like others, we find that alliance commitments may cause moral hazard because allies do not fully internalize the costs of actions that can lead to war. But unlike others, we sho...
| Publié dans: | The Journal of Conflict Resolution. - Sage Publications, Inc.. - 58(2014), 2, Seite 307-335 |
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| Auteur principal: | |
| Autres auteurs: | , |
| Format: | Article en ligne |
| Langue: | English |
| Publié: |
2014
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| Accès à la collection: | The Journal of Conflict Resolution |
| Sujets: | Political science Law Behavioral sciences Philosophy |
| Accès en ligne |
Volltext |