Signaling Alliance Commitments: Hand-Tying and Sunk Costs in Extended Nuclear Deterrence
How can states signal their alliance commitments? Although scholars have developed sophisticated theoretical models of costly signaling in international relations, we know little about which specific policies leaders can implement to signal their commitments. This article addresses this question wit...
| Veröffentlicht in: | American Journal of Political Science. - Blackwell Publishing. - 58(2014), 4, Seite 919-935 |
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| Format: | Online-Aufsatz |
| Sprache: | English |
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2014
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| Zugriff auf das übergeordnete Werk: | American Journal of Political Science |
| Schlagworte: | Applied sciences Behavioral sciences Political science Law Information science |
| Online verfügbar |
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