The Price Effect of Hospital Closures

The Price Effect of Hospital Closures

This paper analyzes the anti-competitive effect of hospital closures between 1993 and 1998. Using a modified rival analysis with difference-in-differences (DD) and difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD) identification strategies, this study finds that competitors located nearest to closed hos...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:Inquiry. - SAGE Publications, 1963. - 45(2008), 3, Seite 280-292
1. Verfasser: Wu, Vivian Y. (VerfasserIn)
Format: Online-Aufsatz
Sprache:English
Veröffentlicht: 2008
Zugriff auf das übergeordnete Werk:Inquiry
Schlagworte:Health sciences Economics Business Arts
LEADER 01000caa a22002652 4500
001 JST040368270
003 DE-627
005 20240621062150.0
007 cr uuu---uuuuu
008 150324s2008 xx |||||o 00| ||eng c
035 |a (DE-627)JST040368270 
035 |a (JST)29773376 
040 |a DE-627  |b ger  |c DE-627  |e rakwb 
041 |a eng 
100 1 |a Wu, Vivian Y.  |e verfasserin  |4 aut 
245 1 4 |a The Price Effect of Hospital Closures 
264 1 |c 2008 
336 |a Text  |b txt  |2 rdacontent 
337 |a Computermedien  |b c  |2 rdamedia 
338 |a Online-Ressource  |b cr  |2 rdacarrier 
520 |a This paper analyzes the anti-competitive effect of hospital closures between 1993 and 1998. Using a modified rival analysis with difference-in-differences (DD) and difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD) identification strategies, this study finds that competitors located nearest to closed hospitals were best able to improve their bargaining position. Moreover, rivals that experienced multiple neighborhood closures, that faced large closures relative to their own sizes, and that were located in more concentrated markets were all able to raise prices even more. The overall estimate suggests a 4%, one-time, permanent price increase due to closure, a strong price effect that has been overlooked in the literature. 
540 |a © 2008 Excellus Health Plan, Inc. 
650 4 |a Health sciences  |x Health care industry  |x Health care facilities  |x Hospitals  |x Teaching hospitals 
650 4 |a Health sciences  |x Health care industry  |x Health care facilities  |x Hospitals  |x Nonprofit hospitals 
650 4 |a Economics  |x Economic disciplines  |x Applied economics  |x Econometrics  |x Economic indicators  |x Economic indices  |x Herfindahl Hirschman index 
650 4 |a Business  |x Business operations  |x Commerce  |x Pricing  |x Prices  |x Market prices 
650 4 |a Arts  |x Applied arts  |x Decorative arts  |x Furniture  |x Beds  |x Hospital beds 
650 4 |a Health sciences  |x Health care industry  |x Health information  |x Biostatistics  |x Health care statistics  |x Hospitalization rates  |x Hospital admissions 
650 4 |a Health sciences  |x Health care industry  |x Health care administration  |x Managed care 
650 4 |a Economics  |x Microeconomics  |x Income  |x Revenue 
650 4 |a Health sciences  |x Health care industry  |x Health care facilities  |x Hospitals  |x Psychiatric hospitals 
650 4 |a Economics  |x Economic disciplines  |x Financial economics  |x Financial market structures  |x Economic competition  |x Imperfect competition  |x Market power  |x Hospital Behavior and Competition 
655 4 |a research-article 
773 0 8 |i Enthalten in  |t Inquiry  |d SAGE Publications, 1963  |g 45(2008), 3, Seite 280-292  |w (DE-627)388092602  |w (DE-600)2147137-X  |x 19457243  |7 nnns 
773 1 8 |g volume:45  |g year:2008  |g number:3  |g pages:280-292 
856 4 0 |u https://www.jstor.org/stable/29773376  |3 Volltext 
912 |a GBV_USEFLAG_A 
912 |a SYSFLAG_A 
912 |a GBV_JST 
912 |a GBV_ILN_11 
912 |a GBV_ILN_20 
912 |a GBV_ILN_22 
912 |a GBV_ILN_23 
912 |a GBV_ILN_24 
912 |a GBV_ILN_31 
912 |a GBV_ILN_32 
912 |a GBV_ILN_39 
912 |a GBV_ILN_40 
912 |a GBV_ILN_60 
912 |a GBV_ILN_62 
912 |a GBV_ILN_63 
912 |a GBV_ILN_65 
912 |a GBV_ILN_69 
912 |a GBV_ILN_70 
912 |a GBV_ILN_73 
912 |a GBV_ILN_74 
912 |a GBV_ILN_90 
912 |a GBV_ILN_95 
912 |a GBV_ILN_100 
912 |a GBV_ILN_101 
912 |a GBV_ILN_105 
912 |a GBV_ILN_110 
912 |a GBV_ILN_150 
912 |a GBV_ILN_151 
912 |a GBV_ILN_161 
912 |a GBV_ILN_170 
912 |a GBV_ILN_206 
912 |a GBV_ILN_213 
912 |a GBV_ILN_230 
912 |a GBV_ILN_285 
912 |a GBV_ILN_293 
912 |a GBV_ILN_370 
912 |a GBV_ILN_374 
912 |a GBV_ILN_602 
912 |a GBV_ILN_702 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2001 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2003 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2005 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2006 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2007 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2008 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2009 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2010 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2011 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2014 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2015 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2018 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2020 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2021 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2025 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2026 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2027 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2031 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2034 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2038 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2044 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2050 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2056 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2057 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2061 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2068 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2098 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2106 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2107 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2111 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2129 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2153 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2190 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2232 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2507 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2949 
912 |a GBV_ILN_2950 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4012 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4035 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4037 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4046 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4112 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4125 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4126 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4242 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4249 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4251 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4305 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4306 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4307 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4313 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4322 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4323 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4324 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4325 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4326 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4335 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4338 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4346 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4367 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4393 
912 |a GBV_ILN_4700 
951 |a AR 
952 |d 45  |j 2008  |e 3  |h 280-292